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ABSTRACT
THE TRADE-OFF BETWE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
IN TRADE UNION OBJECTIVES
by
JohnH. Pencavel
This paper demonstrates that, contrary to a widely—held opinion,
the determination of the goals of unions is fully amenable to empirical
analysis. A characterization of the wage and employment—setting process
in unionized markets is adopted and its qualitative implications
examined. The first—order condition for this model is fitted to time—
series data on the newspaper industry from ten cities.The Inter-
national Typographical Union's objectivefunction reveals very
restricted opportunities for substituting wages for employment in
response to a change in the slope of the employer's labor demand func-
tion.Larger union locals place greater emphasis on wages versus






Thereis now a considerable volume of evidence to suggest that
unionized labor markets operate differently in a number of respects from
non—unionized labor markets. However, in general, these findings have
been reported with little attempt to relate these empirical regularities
to the objectives of and constraints on the decision—making units
involved.Consequently, our understanding of "what may trade unions
maximize?" has advanced only a trifle from the time that John Dunlop
[l9] first raised the question almost 1Oyearsago. The prevailing
opinion appears to be that the problem of modelling trade union behavior
is "virtually intractable" [Johnson, 1975] .Thepurpose of this paper
is to belie this notion.We adopt a characterization similar to
Dunlop's for the determination of wages and employment in unionized
markets and we apply this model to a particular institutional setting.
Our objective is not to endorse the specific model of the trade union
outlined here, but simply to demonstrate that the investigation of union
goals is fully amenable to empirical analysis.
The data examined here describe the wages and employment of
members of the International Typographical Union for ten cities over the
20 years from l9L6 to 1965. This is a truly extraordinary union whose
features are well suited to the particular model outlined. Before the
dramatic technological changes of the last 15 years, the union occupied
a very powerful bargaining position with newspaper firms and, therefore,
there is good reason for interpreting the movements of wages and employ-
ment of these typographers as reflecting the constrained objectives of—2—
the union. This represents a maintained hypothesis in this paper and,
while some observers of this institutional setting may question this
judgement, it is not evident that the sort of abstraction involved here
is any more demanding of empirical phenomena than are the economist's
conventional models of the firm or of the family. Moreover, good reason
exists for investigating the role of the ITtJ in view of the unsatisfac-.
tory state of our understanding of the pattern of wages in the printing
industry which is based on research that has avoided explicit modelling
of the behavior of the union.For instance, in the literature that
seeks an explanation for the movement in money wage rates over time, the
sort of multiple regression equation that is preferred for most indus-
tries always performs lamentably for the printing industry..iJIn
addition, the variation in the wage rates of typographers across cities
is much greater than the typical geographical differentials for a given
occupation and this has never been satisfactorily accounted for..V
Naturally one is led to wonder whether a better understanding of the
union would provide the key to an explanation of these features of the
printing industry.
In this paper the union is characterized as maximizing an objec-
tive function that contains wage rates and employment as arguments and
as being constrained by a trade—off between these two variables given by
the employer's labor demand function. This model which offers a deter-
minate solution to union—management bargaining was articulated most
fullybyWilliam Feliner El9IT1 and Allan Cartter [19591.Asa theory
of the determination of wages and employment in unionized markets, it is—3—
clearly deficient in not explaining how a position of disagreement at
the opening of the collective bargaining process converges over time
into a mutually acceptable contract. Moreover, as Leontief [l961 and
Fellner [l9171 made clear, the solution to the bargaining process pro-
vided by this model lies inside the payoff frontier and thus it is an
inefficient contract from the point of view of the two parties
involved.However, the standard of efficiency used here is one that
presumes the absence of transactions costs to negotiating an agreement
and the empirical relevance of this standard for a union—management
bargaining situation should not be taken for granted. That is, it is
not evident that collective bargaining procedures provide incentives for
the parties to reveal their respective valuations and, in fact, each
party's objective function tends to be camouflaged by a veil of threats,
bluffs, and deceptions. In such circumstances when each party's percep-
tion of its opponent's payoff function is distorted, there is no guar-
antee that the Pareto frontier (defined as excluding these negotiation
costs) will be reached and so there seems no compelling reason either to
presume that union—management contracts are efficient in this sense or
to presume that they are not.
This Fellner—Cartter model is outlined in the following section
and, since there has been little attention addressed to the issue, the
qualitative implications of the model are discussed. Section III
presents a brief description of the ITtJ and the American newspaper
industry and of the data used in this study. Estimates of the objective
functions of the ITtJ locals are presented in Section IV.—4—
II.Conceptual Framework
Ourstarting point is a f iristhathires labor and n other inputs
at given prices to produce an output at minimum cost. The cost function
summarizing this behavior is
C =C(w,r1,r2,...,r,X)
=C(w,r,X)
where w is the wage rate, r the price of input i, and X the level
of output. C is assumed to be smooth and fully differentiable and is a
linearly homogeneous concave function of all input prices.The cost—




Theworkers are organized in a trade union whose leader takes
account of the welfare of all its members as represented by the follow-
ing quasi—concave objective function:
(2) U =g(w,L,Y)
whereUis assumed to be strictly increasing in the wage rate (w)
and in employmentCL).Variables that affect union preferences, but
are exogenous to the union are indexed by Y. These mightinclude the
pricelevel of commodities consumed by unionmembers,the wagereceived
bya comparison group of workers, or the level of unemployment benefits.
This objective function, equation (2), includes as special cases the—5—
wage bill as proposed by Dunlop, rents from unionization as proposed by
de Menu[19711 and Rosen [19701 ,andexpected per member utility as
proposed by Farber [1978] ,McDonaldand Solow [19811 ,andOswald [1982]
The union selects w and L to maximize its objective function,
equation (2), subject to the choice of w and L being restricted by
the employer's labor demand function, equation (1).The situation in
which the union determines the wage rate and then leaves the employer to
determine employment through equation (i) is, of course, consistent with





g2U/aL >0or the marginal rate of
substitution of wages for employment in the union's objective function
equals the slope (s) of the firm's labor demand function. The second—
order condition for a maximum may be written as
() = — 1wg1(swL1+i)-2s
where s =s/w,swL is the wage elasticity of the firm's labor
demand function, and a is the elasticity of substitution between wages
and employment in the union's objective function.The reduced form
equations may be derived from equations (1) and (3) and they express
wage rates and employment as functions of all the exogenous variables:
(5) = ;—6—
(6) L =2(Y,r,X)
These reduced form equations and the marginal rate of substitution
equation (3) are invariant under positive monotonic transformations of
the union's objective function.
The qualitative content of this model of unionism is assessed by
determining the signs of the partial derivatives of equations (5) and
(6). In fact, without specifying particular expressions for the objec-
tive and constraint functions, all that can be said about the signs of
these derivatives is that the sign of L/Y must be opposite that of
aw/3Y: an increase in Y alters the objective function, but does not
disturb the constraint C so if the union opts for an increase in wage
rates then this must be accompanied by a decrease in employment. Other
than this restriction across equations (5) and (6), the sign of each of
the partial derivatives is ambiguous and in this sense the model is
empty of qualitative implications.i" This is not surprising in view of
the theorem of conjugate pairs [Archibald, 1965], but it is odd that a
model with so little qualitative content should have provoked such an
extensive debate as that which arose over whether or not the trade union
can be portrayed as maximizing anything..!
The dual of this problem describes the union as selecting w
and L to minimize the parameters of the labor demand function
Cw =L(w,r,X)subject to a prescribed value of the objective function
U0 >g(w,L,Y).Naturally, the first—order condition for this problem
is again given by equation (3) which may be solved jointly with the-.7—




The derivatives of these equations can be related to those of equations
(5) and (6) in lutsky—type fashion, but, unless further restrictions
are placed on the objective function or on the constraint function, the
"utility—constant" derivatives (such as and ip1/aX) cannot be
signed.
Instead of dwelling on the dearth of qualitative statements that
canbemade, consider what restrictions on the model wifl yield unambig-
uous implications. For instance, suppose labor is not an inferior input
(so c/x >0)and suppose that the union's objective function is
strongly separable in wages and employment (sog12 0). Then,
provided an increase in output does not increase the slope of the labor
demand function with respect to wage rates (that is, provided
s <a),an increase in output will induce an increase in the optimal
wage rate. On the corresponding set of assumptions, an increase in the
price of an input that is a substitute for labor will induce an increase
in the optimal wagerate.In these two cases, whether or not optimal
employment also increases depends upon the magnitude of the slope of the
labor demand function with respect to wages. Alternatively, suppose the
union maximizes the total rents from unionization. Once again, if labor—8—
isnot an inferior input and provided an increase in output does not
increase the slope of the labor demand function, then an increase in
output will induce an increase in the optimal wage rate. However, so
little is known about the nature of the union's preferences for wages
and employment that we are in no position to assess the empirical rele-
vance of alternative prior restrictions on the union's objective func-
tion. For example, Cartter's [19591 conjecture that the elasticity of
substitution between wages and employment in the union's objective
function is very lowi has never been confronted with the evidence
although the limiting case of this hypothesis-—that wages and employment
are combined in fixed proportions——would considerably simplify models of
unionized labor markets.
III •TheInstitutional Backgroundand the Data
The data used to estimate the union's objective function consist
of annual observations on wages, employment, and other variables
describing the members of the International Typographical Union and the
newspaper industry in ten American cities from 1946 to 1965. The ITIJ is
the quintessential democratic union where the leaders exercise very
little discretionary authority, where the perquisites of being an offi—
cial are few, where the rank—and—file are intimately involved in the
management of the union, and where there are no important skill differ-
entials within the union..J Consequently, an objective function such as
equation (2) that does not differentiate between the interests of the
leadership and of the rank—and—file or between various groups within the—9—
rank—and—fileis well suited to the ITU. Moreover, it is evident from
the ITU's well—known concern for the employment effects of new tech-
nology that the employment of its members occupied a very important
place in its objectives.On the other hand, the popular portrayal of
the union as relentlessly opposing new composing methods is something of
a caricature.There have been occasions on which the union has spon-
sored inventions and it established its own research and development
laboratory and staff in the 1950s.The more accurate description is
that the ITU adapted to and controlled the new technology up until the
mid—196Os.IJIn the period before the dramatic technological changes
that have taken place in the new-paper industry in the last fifteen years
or so, the ITU had clearly established a dominant bargaining relation-
ship with the employers: collective bargaining took place at the local
level where the ITU operated a closed shop requiring every worker in the
composing room, including the foreman, to be a. member of the union.
Newspapers were extremely vulnerable to an interruption in production
and, in fact, for the ten union locals in the years analyzed below, no
strikes took place. The ITtJ was a highly sophisticated union andvery
mindful of the competitive environment in which newspapers operated.
Wage increases not matched by increases in productivity would translate
into newspaper price and advertising rate increases that, other things
equal, would harm the newspaper's total revenue and ultimately dis-
courage ITU employment.—10—
The data most appropriate for a study of this kind describe the
production processes of a particular newspaper and, in fact, such data
have been obtained for the Cincinnati Post.i For Cincinnati, w stands
for the hourly wage for journeymen printers at the Post and L is the
number of full—time typographical workers in the Post composing room.
In 1958, the Post merged with the Cincinnati Times—Star and the ITU
membersof the Times—Star chapel were absorbed into the Post composing
room.The primaryproblempresented by extending the study to other
cities is the difficulty of obtaining employment data. The
ical Journal, the union's publication, supplies data on local union
membership, but these figures will include ITU members employed in
commercial (book and job) printing establishments.Typically, major
book and job establishments are located in very large cities so, if we
avoid these cities, a much closer correspondence between local union
membership and newspaper employment is reached.Therefore, for nine
other cities, the data on L represent local union membership.
Average values of w and L over the years l946—65 for the ten
cities are given in Table I together with other characteristics of these
cities. The cities range from Columbus, Ohio, that had a mean journey—
manmembershipof just over 600 in these years to Fond du Lac,
Wisconsin, which was about one—fifteenth the size of Columbus. Average
money wages ranged from a high of $2.9L in Columbus to $2.1T in
Dubuque. In fact, the wages of typographers vary markedly across all
cities in the United States and a thorough explanation for these differ-
entials has yet to be provided. For the ten cities listed in Table I—11—
Table I
Mean Values of Variables for Ten Cities
Averaged Over the Years 1946—1965
W W/p L X 1960 population
1 Cincinnatitm, OH 2.883.51172 18.8 503
2 Augusta, GA 2.352.96 5619.5 71
3 Columbia, SC 2.422.99 10523.6 97
14 Dubuquetm,10 2.17 2.73 689.3 57
5 Memphis, TN 2.843.46323 42.5
6 Fonddu Lac, WI 2.412.96 41 7.8 33
7Louisville,KY 2.893.44397143.7 391
8 Elmira, NY 2.633.15120 16.3
9 Columbustm,OH 2.94 3.58602 51.0
10 Albanytm, NY 2.78 3.3859630.8 130
All ten cities pooled 2.653.24 26227.1 230
Notes:The superscript "m" following four of the cities identifies those
cities in which a newspaper merger took place between newspapers during
these years. The average hourly wage scale for Journeymen is given by w
and w/p is w deflated by the consumer price index. L denotes employ-
ment at the Post for Cincinnati and it represents local union membership
for the other cities. The data on w are from issues of the ITU Bulletin
while union membership data come from the Typographical Journal.The
Post's advertising image (in thousands) in April is listed in the column
headed X while for the other cities X is total image sold by all the
local daily newspapers.This information onXcomes from issues of
Editor and Publisher, a trade magazine. A rough index of potential reader-
ship is provided by the numbers on the population (in thousands) of each
city in 1960. These population figures are taken from Table 30 of the 1960
Census of Population, Vol 1, Characteristics of the Population, Part 1,
U.S. Summary.—12—
over these years, there were strong positive trends in both real wages
andemployment, but virtually no cyclical movements in these variables,
a finding consistent with the belief that unionism tends to insulate
these labor market variables from cyclical movements in economic
activity.
IV. Empirical Results
One way of implementing the model of unionism outlined above is to
posit particular functional forms for the union's objective function,
equation (2), and for the firm's labor demand function, equation Ci),
and then to estimate the implied reduced form equations for wages and
employment, equations (5) and (6). This procedure has been applied in
previous work2i and it possesses the attractive feature of permitting
simulation exercises on the reduced form equations. On the other hand,
the closed form solution of the reduced form system can be obtained only
if relatively simple expressions are specified for the union's objective
function and for the labor demand function.Hence, if we limit our-
selves to reduced formestimation,then this rules out some interesting
general forms for the objective and constraint equations. Consequently,
a different course is pursued here, one of estimating the marginal rate
of substitution equation (3). This has the computational advantage of
requiring nothing more than standard two—stage least—squares.
Suppose the union's objective function takes the following form
where p denotes the consumer price index, a measure of the price level
of consumer goods purchased by union workers:—13—




=k+(i+ — )1+A+(1— +
wherek =— [(i+ + (i—)(i+)_1J and where 0 << 1
and w/p >y.This objective function is quasi—concave if the following
expression is negative:
(8)(l— — y)1L[A(1— +-)X1]
a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for which being that both A
and r are negative. This strongly separable function, equation (7),
is the addilog augmented by the parameter y that provides a reference
point for real wages. This function has the appealing feature of nest-
ingsomeinteresting special cases. For instance, consider
A =+ -1.Then the objective function maybewritten as follows:
U(,L) = log ( —y)+(1— log L
and if, futhermore, j= 0.5and y equals the competitive real wage,
thenthis objective function is a transformation of the rents from
unionization, an objective discussed by Dunlop [19441,Rosen[1970), and
de Menu[19711 .Ifx =+ —1, =0.5and y =0,the objective
function is a transformation of Dunlop's wage bill maximand.Or if
y =0and A =r* —1, the objective function is a transformation of_J)4_
the constant—elasticity—of—substitution function, but otherwise the
elasticity of substitution (a)between wages and employment in the
union's objective function is not constant and, in particular, a is
given by the following expression:
Clearly, unless the parameters assume the particular values discussed
above, the union's preferences for wages vis——vis employment cannot be
described fully by a single parameter and the value of the substitution
elasticity depends on the particular combination of wages and employment
being evaluated.
With this augmented addilog objective function, the natural log-
arithm of the marginal rate of substitution equation (3) is as follows:
X log (— y)+log
') — logp —rlog L =logs
where, as before, s is the slope of the firm's labor demand function.
The empirical implementation of this equation requires an expression for
the slope of the labor demand function and this has been assumed to be
10/ s =e/r where X indexes output— and r denotes the price of
newsprint (in hundreds of dollars per short ton) as quoted in national
markets. Newsprint is a very important input into newspaper production
and previous work indicated that the ratio of wages to the price of
newsprint exercised a highly significant influence upon typographer
wXw -1)(—)+ (1-
p p—15—
employment. The specification here builds upon this finding by allowing
the slope of the labor demand function to depend upon output (x)as
well. Integration will reveal that very general labor demand functions
and cost functions (including cost functions exhibiting decreasing or
constant or increasing returns to scale) are consistent with this
expression for5.!i'In addition, the reference parameter for real
wages (y)is specified not as a fixed constant but as a constant
proportion of the real wages of another group of workers, say,
y =$(Wa/P),a popular special case of this being 1. With these
assumptions concerning s and y, the previous equation may be written
(9)log()= log{8() +exp[
log(1 U)+log()+logL +
and,after a stochastic error term is added to the right—hand side, this
equation may be fitted by nonlinear two—stage least—squares methods
[Ainemiya, 1971 where employment is treated as endogenous.!V
Table II presents the results from fitting equation (9) to the
pooled 182 observations on all ten union locals together. To serve as a
reference wage series (Wa), both the average hourly earnings of non—
supervisory workers in retail trade (who are almost wholly non—
unionized) and the average hourly earnings of production workers in
manufacturing industry were used. These two wage series move together
over the years from 1946 to 1965 so there is little difference between—16--
Table II
Estimates of the Marginal Rate of Substitution Equation (9)
(standard errors in parentheses)
Line x a see
(1) 1.2570.195—0.994—0.2270.0010.3610.061
(0.081) (o.o4) (0.210) (0.065) (0.003) (0.085)
(ii) 1.2900.111—0.591—0.4150.0150.5800.468
(0.132) (0.051) (0.173) (o.iii) (0.006) (o.i48)
(iii) 1.3000.337—0.838—0.1110.0010.402 0.0110
(0.117) (0.180) (0.211) (0.191) (0.003) (0.061)
(iv) 0.77110.356 —11.6211—0.163 —0.0860.131 0.137
(0.437) (1.163) (10.365) (1.288) (0.255) (0.286)
(v) i.o6i0.709—2.406 0.063 -0.0200.1910.031
(0.175) (0.417) (0.940) (0.514) (o.on) (0.061)
(vi) 1.5250.513—0.311 0.1570.0010.7070.041
(0.205) (0.286) (0.284) (0.293) (o.oos) (0.330)
Notes: The standard error of the regression is given by "see." The mean and
standard deviation of log(w/p) over all observations are 1.165 and 0.145
respectively. The mean and standard deviation of log L are 5.167 and 0.9116.
The elasticity of substitution (a) between wages and employment is evaluated
for all of the entries above at the overall mean values of real wages and
employment, namely, 3.24 and 262 respectively and with a/ =1.66,its mean
value.—17—
the two sets of estimates. The results presented in Table II correspond
to the use of the wage of retail trade workers for w5. According to
the estimates in line (1), Xis very close to —1 and 8 is not
appreciably greater than unity so that the first term in the union's
objective function approximates the expression Log (W —W)
However, with i significantly different from 0,5 and r significantly
different from unity judged by conventional criteria, the data do not
seem to be consistent with an objective function that takes the form o
the rents from unionization. Equation (9) is normalized with respect to
the logarithm of real wages, but the instrumental variables estimator of
a nonlinear equation is not invariant to the variable aeleted for
normalization.Consequently, the estimates in line (ii) of Table II
report the effects of rewriting equation (9) so that log L constitutes
the left—hand side variable and where the sane set of intruments are
used forlog (w/p).These estimates do not d4ffer appreciably from
those in line (i) except that ),andr are closer to being equal to
one another. However, 8 remains significanty different from unity so
that a simple constant—elasticity—of—substitution (CES) function does
not appropriately describe this union's objectives,
The estimates reported in line (iii) correspond to fitting equa-
tion (9) after augmenting it with a vector of dumrvariablesfor each
of the union locals.In particular, suppos the slope of the labor
demand function iss =exp(x + 1Z)/r where 2 takes the value
of unity for the ith union local and of zero otherwise. Then equation
(9) is respecified to include the terms 6.Z./X witin the square—18—
brackets. The resulting estimates of the objective function parameters
do not differ in any meaningful sense from those in the previous
lines. In particular, the estimates are not consistent with the special
functional forms that are nested in our specification, namely, the wage
bill maximand, the rents from unionization, and the CES function.
Line (iv) of Table II reports the estimates of equation (9) that
treat output (in addition to employment) as endogenousJ The most
noticeable feature of these estimates is the increase in the standard
errors over those in previous lines and no doubt this reflects, in part,
the inadequacy of our instrumental variables. These estimates, testify
to the fact that confident inferences from these results about the
nature of this union's objectives are simply unwarranted at this stage
of the research.-i!i
To this point, although differences among the ten cities have been
permitted in the slope of the labor demand constraint, the parameters of
ITU's objective function have been assumed to be the same for all ten
locals. Previous work [Dertouzos and Pencavel, 19811 suggested that the
objective function probably varied with the size of the union so this
sample of ten ITU locals was split into two categories of five
relatively small union locals and five relatively large union locals.
The large union locals consist of Cincinnati, Memphis, Louisville,
Columbus, and Albany and over the l946—65 period their average real
wages ranged from 3.38 to 3.58, their employment averaged 4l8, and they
operated in the larger cities with an average 1960 population of almost
I00,0O0 people (see Table I).The small union locals are those in—19—
Augusta, Columbia, Dubuque, Fond du Lac, and Elmira and in these years
they had a lower average real wage (namely, 2.96), their average employ-
ment was 78,andthey were located in the smaller cities with an average
population in 1960 of 6i,ooopeople.On all three criteria (real wages,
employment, and population), the smallest of the group of relatively
large union locals was greater than the largest of the group of rela-
tively small union locals. Then equation (9) augmented by a vector of
union dumn variables (i.e., by the terms in the notation
introduced earlier) was fitted to each of the two groups of union
locals. The results are presented in lines (v) and (vi) of Table II,
the relatively large union locals in line (v) and the relatively small
union locals in line (vi).
Although the estimated standard errors caution against confident
inferences, the larger 1W locals tend to place slightly more weight on
"supernumerary" real wages relative to employment (as given by ).
Thismay be the consequence of the greater alternative employment possi-
bilities (especially in commercial printing) available in the bigger
cities where the larger unions were located. The smaller union locals
reveal less restricted opportunities of substituting real wages for
employment in their objectives (as given by )thanthe larger union
locals and, indeed, for the smaller union locals the hypothesis of a
unitary substitution elasticity cannot be rejected.For the larger
union locals' estimates in line (v), each of the null hypotheses
8 =1,=0.5,X =—1,and =—1cannot be rejected by conventional
criteria and these are precisely the parameter values implied if the—20—
union locals maximize the rents from unionization.!J This does not
appear to be an appropriate description of the objective function,
however, for the group of relatively small union locals (line (vi)). A
conventional test of the null hypothesis that the two groups of union
locals have the same objective function parameters is decisively
rejected.J.!Further disaggregation to the level of each individual
union local seems not to be warranted, however.!L'
What appears to be a common finding in all the results in Table II
is an estimate of the elasticity of substitution ()betweenwages and
employment in the ITU's objective function that lies between zero and
unity.Only for the relatively imprecise estimates in line (iv) (in
which both employment and output are endogenous) is cynotsignifi-
cantly different from zero.In other words, these results are fully
consistent with Cartter's conjecture that a union's objectives allow
relatively little scope for substituting wages for employment. However,
the limiting case of fixed wage and employment combinations also appears
to be rejected by these estimates.!J
V. Conclusions
Two approaches to the issue of wage and employment determination
in unionized labor markets can be identified. One approach takes the
objectives of the trade union as given and enquires into the character-
istics of the solution to the resulting bargaining problem [de Menil,
1971; McDonald and Solow, 1981; Rosen, 1970] .Thesecond approach takes
as a maintained hypothesis the method through which wages and employment—21—
are settled and investigates the objectives of the union [Dertouzos,
1979; Dertouzos and Pencavel, 1981; Farber, 19781 .Thispaper has
followed this second approach and has shown that, contrary to widespread
belief, the questions involved in ascertaining the objectives of trade
unions can be addressed through conventional empirical procedures. The
union examined here is the ITU over the period l916_65 and perhaps our
most consistent finding is that the elasticity of substitution between
wages and employment in the union's objective function tends to lie
between zero and unity.This suggests quite restricted opportunities
for trading off wages for employment.The larger ITU locals possess
objectives that approximate the rents from unionization although it
would be imprudent to attach a high degree of confidence to this
inference in view of the standard errors accompanying the point esti-
mates of the objective function parameters.Moreover, it should be
stressed that the empirical implementation of the model requires speci-
fications for two behavioral relationships, the union's objective func-
tion and the firm's labor demand function (or the first derivatives of
both functions), and, therefore, estimates of the union's objective
function parameters maybesensitive to the precise specification of the
labor demand functiOn..12i
Whatdothese results suggest for the two empirical anomalies
alluded to earlier, namely, the time series movements of wages in the
printing industry and the variation in typographers' wages across
different cities? Because bargaining takes place at the locallevel,it
is not surprising that aggregative variables such as the unemployment—22—
rate in the entire economy are not highly correlated with movements over
time of wages in the printing industry. On the other hand, the model of
the wage—setting process outlined in this paper does identify the con-
sumer price index as being relevant to money wage differences as should
be differences in the exogenous variables of the labor demand function
(such as the prices of other inputs and the factors determining news-
paper output).If the objective functions of these union locals are
characterized by little substitutability between wages and employment,
then differences in the slope of the labor demand function will generate
relatively small differences in (real) wages. In this event, the inter—
city variation in wages is a consequence of differences in the location
of the labor demand function with, for instance, newspapers in big
metropolitan areas with a larger circulation paying higher wages (which
is exactly what is observed).On the other hand, if more observations
on each union local were available, then the objective function para-
meter estimates in Table II might be more precisely estimated and sig-
nificant differences across union locals might emerge. If this were the
case, the observed intercity variation in wages would reflect, in part,
the different weights attached to wages in the unions' objective func-
tions and, then, an explanation for these variations in objectives would
be called for.
A very large body of research now exists that applies constrained
optimization models of the household and of the firm to data on consump-
tion expenditure and production.In contrast, the literature on the
behavior of the union became enmeshed in unproductive methodological—23—
squabbles and economists turned their interest towards the measurement
of the various effects of unions without imbedding their measurement
procedures in precisely articulated behavioral models.Consequently,
there is a large body of research documenting the empirical regularities
associated with unionism, but there is little interpretation of these
regularities in terms of economic behavior. The primary purpose of this
paper has been to show by way of example that purposive models of union-
ism (such as the one outlined here) have operational content and can be
analyzed empirically.
Department of Economics, Stanford University, California
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Footnotes
*Iam indebted to Paul Chen and Cathy Hartsog for their proficient
research assistance, to Thomas MaCurdy, Andrew Oswald, and James
Rosse for useful discussions during the preparation of this paper,
and to two anonymous referees for their reactions to an early
draft. I have also benefitted from a Sloan Foundation grant to
the Department of Economics at Stanford University.
1/ Forinstance, in Wachter's 119701 time series analysis of wages in
two—digit manufacturing industries, his preferred equation for the
printing industry has only a time trend as a relevant regressor
and no significant role is found for the unemployment rate, for
price changes, and for movements in the industry's value added.
Even more striking are the results reported by Eckstein and Wilson
[19621 where R2's for wage changes in the printing industry are
recorded of 0.01 while most other industries generateR2's
greater than 0.90.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics' wage surveys reveal that for hand
compositors at night work in the newspaper industry workers in the
city reporting the highest wage earned 55% more in July 19)46 and
28% more in July 1965 than workers in the city reporting the
lowest wage. This range is all the more remarkable in view of the
fact that these wage data relate to workers in a narrowly—defined
occupation,themembersofwhich possessverysimilar
characteristics from city to city.(These data are published in
BLS Bulletins No. 912 and No. 1)489.)
Indeed, even with further restrictions on the model, ambiguities
prevail.For instance, suppose the slope of the labor demand
function is independent both of wages and of the scale of produc-
tion (i.e., suppose as/aw =as/ax=o).Then the effect on opti—
mal wage of a proportional increase in output is
—1 —1 —1 a2,nw/a,nX = eL( 1g12 —g2g22)1(1 +swL )wheree is the
elasticity of the demand for labor with respect to output,
g12 =a2U/awaL,and g22 =a2U/3L2.If, in addition, the union's
preferences are homogenous with respect to w and L, then
a,.nw/a,.nX =eLg1g12.These expressions are ambiguous in sign.—25—
IL' The adversaries in this debate were, of course, Dunlop [i9'iJii who
maintained, "An economic theory of a trade union requires that the
organization be assumed to maximize (or minimize) something.
Although not the only possible objective, maximization of the wage
bill may be regarded as the standard case" (p. L) and Ross [19I81
who responded, "The wage policy of unions...is not to be found in
the mechanical application of any maximization principle" (p. 8).
Cartter [1959, pp. 89—901 wrote: "It would seem most likely, once
a unionis already enjoying a particular wage—employment
combination, that it would take a considerable increase in wages
to compensate for a reduction in employment, and it would take a
considerable increase in employment to compensate for a wage
reduction. This is reasoned to be true because of the internal
political pressures the union would be subject to if it openly
agreed to either of these reductions."
§1 The justifications for these statements are to be found in the
classic study by Lipset, Trow, and Coleman [19561
.1-! See Kelber and Schlesinger [19671. Today the very survival of the
ITU in its traditional form is threatened by the diffusion of
typesetting computers and photographic processes which have
eliminated many of the skills once required of printers.The
dramatic consequences of this automation for New York's Local 6
are documented by Rogers and Friedman [1980]
These data were obtained by James Dertouzos while consulting for
the proprietors of the Cincinnati Post.
.2! Dertouzos [19791 and Dertouzos and Pencavel [19811 fitted the
reduced form real wage equation jointly with the stochastic form
of the employer's labor demand function. The estimates so derived
were very similar to the maximum likelihood estimation of the
reduced form real wage and employment equations as given in
Pencavel [1982].
Output is measured here by the amount of advertising image sold
annually and average values of this variable are listed in Table
I. This output index measures only one dimension (albeit the most
important in terms of newspaper revenues) of newpaper output and
is not perfectly correlated with other dimensions such as the
space devoted to news.Moreover, although many of the primary
determinants of output are beyond the control of the newpaper firm—26—
(in particular, the size and wealth of a city's population and the
number of television channels to which advertisers have access),
it would be inappropriate to treat output invariably as
exogenous. For these reasons, a set of estimates was derived for
which output was characterized as endogenous. These are reported
below.
Thus, the labor demand function implied by this expression for
sis L =f(.)— (w/r)exp (ix) where f(. )issome unspecified
function of X,r, and the prices of other inputs (except for
w).
The exogenous variables consist of log (p/r), x, w°7p, the whole-
sale price index of machinery and equipment and quadratic terms
and interactions among these variables.
The exogenous variables used to instrument for employment and
output in this equation are log (p/r), log q (a/)2
(log (p/r))2, (log q)2, T, T. log q ,T.log (p/r), and
T •aiwhere qis a wholesale price index of machinery and
equipment and T is a time trend.
For all these estimates, the quasi—concavity conditi-on (equation
(8))wassatisfiedfor all observations in the sample.
The elasticity of substitution (a)is a highly nonlinear
function of all the objective function parameters, however, so
that, although each of the objective function parameters is not
significantly different from the value assumed under the rent
maximization hypothesis, a is significantly different from unity
(which is the value taken by ais the union's objectives were
exactly rent maximization).
In this case, the calculated value of the F statistic is 9.9)4
which exceeds by a large margin the critical value from the F
distribution.
IL!Forthe group of large union locals, the null hypothesis of no
difference in the objective functions among the five locals yields
a calculated F of 1.52whilethe corresponding value for the group
of small union locals is 2.01. Each of these falls short of the—2T—
critical F value at the 1% percent level of significance. Of
course, these test statistics are only approximate in this instru-
mental variable context.
In equations fitted to each union local separately, a number of
variations in the estimation procedure were applied to equation
(9). First, the constraint that the slope of labor demand
function be homogenous of degree minus unity in input prices was
relaxed. Second, the equation was fitted in first difference form
(year to year changes) with allowance for a linear time trend.
Third, the objective function parameters were allowed to change
after a merger between newspapers in those four cities in which a
merger was recorded in these years. In each of these cases, the
inferences about the objective function of the ITJwerenot
materially different from those in the main text.
!21Some examination of this issue was undertaken by specifying
different slopes for the labor demand function.The resulting
estimates of the unionts objective function parameters were riot
substantially different from those reported above.—28—
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